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Abstract
Background: Local decision making is linked to several service quality improvement parameters. Rogi Kalyan
Samitis (RKS) at peripheral decision making health units (DMHU) are composite bodies that are mandated to ensure
accountability and transparency in governance, improve quality of services, and facilitate local responsiveness. There
is scant literature on the nature of functioning of these institutions in Odisha. This study aimed to assess the
perception of RKS members about their roles, involvement and practices with respect to local decision making and
management of DMHUs; it further examined perceptual and functional differences between priority and non-priority
district set-ups; and identified predictors of involvement of RKS members in local governance of health units.
Methods: As members of RKS, health service providers, officials in administrative/managerial role, elected
representatives, and officials from other departments (including independent members) constituted our study
sample. A total of 112 respondents were interviewed across 6 districts, through a multi-stage stratified random sampling;
we used a semi-structured interview schedule that comprised mainly of close-ended and some open-ended questions.
Descriptive and inferential statistics were used to compare 3 priority (PD) and 3 non-priority districts (NPD), categorized
on the basis of Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) estimates of 2011 as proxy of population health. Governance, human resource
management, financial management and quality improvement functions were studied in detail. Opinion about various
individual and organizational factors in local self-governance and predictors of involvement were identified.
Results: The socio-demographic profile and composition of respondents were comparable between PD and NPD.
Majority of respondents were ‘satisfied’ with their current roles in the governance of local health institutions. About one-
fourth opined that the amount of funds allocated to RKS under National Health Mission (NHM) was ‘grossly insufficient’.
Fifty percent of respondents said they requested for additional funds, last year, and 38.8 % informed that they requested
additional funds for purchase of drugs. About 87 % respondents were satisfied with their role in the local governance of
the health units (PD = 94.3 % vs. NPD = 80.7 %). Almost all (PD = 98 % vs. NPD = 80.7 %) opined that local decision
making helped in improving the performance of health units. For most of the open-ended questions the responses
were non-specific. Staggering differences were found between PD and NPD with respect to their involvement in district
plan preparation (NPD = 78.9 % vs. PD = 58.5 %), training in plan preparation (NPD = 47.4 % vs. PD = 27.5 %), participation
of officials from other departments (PD = 96.9 % vs. NPD = 45.5 %), and inclusion of activities of other sectors (PD = 70.
8 % vs. NPD = 41.8 %). Whereas, no significant PD-NPD difference was found about their perceived ‘involvement’ in
undertaking the 12 designated responsibilities. Composite scores on various individual and organizational factors were
compared and found to be varying significantly. Through regression, we inferred work experience, qualification and non-
monetary incentives as strong determinants of current level of involvement of RKS members in governance and
management of health units.
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Conclusion: Poor knowledge/expectation of RKS members was diluting the decision making process at DMHUs. There
is an urgent need to improve their knowledge, understanding and expertise in areas of governance and management
practices. A locally-monitored and time-bound capacity building plan could achieve this. Yearly resource allocation for
drug procurement needs revision. Specific eligibility criteria based on work experience and qualification may be fixed for
RKS membership. Further research may focus on identifying the underlying individual and systemic factors behind such
large PD-NPD differences.
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Background
Decentralization is the process of transferring power, au-
thority, resources, functions and service delivery respon-
sibilities from the central government to the lower-level
institutions in a political administrative structure [1–5].
‘Power’ is the ability to influence people, while ‘authority’,
power conferred for a purpose. In the context of govern-
ance of public health systems, the latter is more often re-
ferred to than the former. Decentralization or local
decision-making, as is often understood, is recognized as
an important means of improving service delivery [6–8].
Improved efficiency and effectiveness, accountability, re-
sponsiveness, community participation, service integra-
tion and intersectoral coordination are considered as the
key benefits of decentralization. Further, it is argued that
shared governance would be knowledge-based; foster
decision making at the point of service, improve dir-
ect communication between the clients and decision
makers, and ensure accountability [9]. However, the
evidences generated on the impact of such a reform
are inconclusive [10–19].
The ‘health system strengthening’ approach has gained
momentum in the last decade. Many national govern-
ments and even global health institutions have started
investing in systems strengthening [20–25]. Evidences
indicate that the health system’s performance in achiev-
ing the objectives of efficiency, quality and equity is con-
tingent upon the width of ‘decision space’ at the local
level. The functional areas of finance, service autonomy,
recruitment rules, access rules and departmental rules
normally have very narrow ‘decision space’ at local level.
On the other hand, the administrative environment
comprises of factors, such as, support for supervisors,
enabling work environment and efficient funds flow.
Decentralization is considered an effective governance
mechanism to promote health system performance
[26–29]. The thin line of difference between govern-
ance and management is explained in terms of the
roles, focus and outputs. The former is related to vi-
sioning and policy development, while the latter is
mainly day-to-day implementation.
In the Indian context, the high burden of malnour-
ishment among children, high mortalities and other
pregnancy-related complications brought back the focus
to improving access to care through establishment of a
wide network of public health facilities, and implementa-
tion of several outreach programs. Such efforts got a
boosting after the formal launching of National Health
Mission (NHM), earlier termed NRHM, in April 2005
[20, 30, 31]. Universal access to affordable, equitable,
and quality health care became the key objectives of
public health system. Improved funds availability,
ready-to-use infrastructure, higher institutional stan-
dards, availability of trained human resources, and
decentralized governance became the immediate goals.
In this context the historical 73rd and 74th Constitutional
Amendments (1992) conferred more powers to the Gram
Panchayats (GP) for rural- and Municipalities/Notified
Area Councils (NAC) for urban/peri-urban areas, respect-
ively. Many decision-taking responsibilities were devolved
to people’s representatives [32]. In Odisha, the formation
in 1998 of the state health & family welfare society and
the amalgamation of district health & family welfare soci-
eties in 1999 were key milestones. Subsequently, for public
service delivery health institutions, such as, hospitals and
health care centres, Rogi Kalyan Samiti’s (RKS) were
formed as institutions of local decision making to take the
public health system agenda forward.
Each public health institution in Odisha from medical
college to primary health centres (PHC) has a RKS as to
facilitate community control, ensure quality enhance-
ment, comply with minimal quality benchmarks, and
foster local accountability and transparency in govern-
ance [24, 25, 33]. The RKS comprises of health service
providers, officials in administrative/managerial role,
elected representatives of panchayat raj institutions
(PRI), and officials from other departments (including
independent members), though such categories are nei-
ther tightly compartmentalized, nor mutually exclusive.
Broadly, the functions of RKS can be classified into five
thematic domains: a) Governance (accountability, re-
sponsiveness and transparency); b) Infrastructure (con-
struction, and maintenance, purchase and out-sourcing);
c) Human resources management (hiring, transfer and
training of staff ); d) Financial resource management
(cost-cutting measures, resource generation); and e)
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Quality improvement (supervision, modernization, qual-
ity assurance and accreditation) [33].
Earlier studies have identified numerous demand-side
factors as important barriers to healthcare utilization,
but there is scant literature on the current state of affairs
with regard to the functioning of local governance insti-
tutions in public health sector [34] Authors have further
argued that good governance and management of health
services at peripheral level are strongly associated with
improved population health outcomes [35–37]. Thus it
is important to examine the perception of key stake-
holders about the nature and process of local self-
governance. This study focused on examining the roles,
involvement and experiences of RKS members in the
functioning of peripheral health units in Odisha. We
assessed the knowledge, perception and practices of RKS
members about their own ability and willingness to ad-
dress local health systems related issues, such as, recruit-
ing staff, generating and using funds, strengthening drug
procurement and logistics supply, developing infrastruc-
ture, and organizing training for the staff. The study
would not only identify the gaps but also would substan-
tially inform the policy makers, because ultimately it is
the government that decides on the policies, controls
and distributes resources, and brings about reforms.
Objectives and research questions
The study aimed to assess the knowledge, perception
and experiences of local decision makers about their
own abilities, training status, roles, and involvement in
the local governance of health units for effective func-
tioning and service delivery. It focused on exploring
their specific roles on governance, infrastructure devel-
opment, human resources management, financial man-
agement and quality of service delivery. Further, we
aimed to examine the perceptual and functional differ-
ences between priority and non-priority district set-ups;
and to identify predictors for involvement of RKS mem-
bers in local governance of health units.
Methods
Working definitions
Devolution refers to the legal transfer of power to demo-
cratically elected local political organs, independent of
the central government. Deconcentration is handing
over some of its authority to the administrative local of-
fices of the ministry, responsible for health. Delegation
refers to the transfer of defined managerial and adminis-
trative functions and responsibilities to institutions that
are outside of the central government. These institutions
can be indirectly controlled by the health ministry
[13, 38–42]. Individual factors in this study included
work experience, qualification, interest for future in-
volvement, current training status and interest for future
training; under organizational factors we included district
category, relationship with other RKS members, frequency
of conducting RKS review, power/authority, community
demands, monetary incentives, good leadership, non-
monetary incentives, and other work-related factors.
Study setting
The peripheral public healthcare delivery system oper-
ates at four hierarchical levels: sub-centres (SC), primary
health centers (PHC), community health centers (CHC),
and sub-divisional hospitals (SDH) and district head-
quarters hospitals (DHH). CHCs serve a population of
80,000-120,000; PHCs cater to about 20,000-30,000
population, while SCs, approximately 5,000. SCs are
manned with one auxiliary nurse and midwife (ANM)
and, sometimes, another additional ANM to provide es-
sential primary care. PHCs are stipulated to have six in-
patient beds, one medical officer and 16 paramedical
and other staff. The activities involve curative, prevent-
ive, and promotional health care. PHCs are expected to
be equipped to provide 24/7 normal and assisted deliver-
ies, ante-natal care, postnatal care, newborn care, family
planning, and full child immunizations. CHCs have mul-
tiple doctors and/or specialists, about 20–30 inpatient
beds and a committed information manager [43]. The
DHH is the highest service delivery point at district
level, with about 100–500 beds, multiple specialists and
services. The state has 6688 SCs, 1279 PHCs, 120 other
hospitals, 231 CHCs, 22 SDHs, 32 DHHs and 3 Medical
Colleges (MC) [44]. Each institution from PCH to MC
has a registered RKS. With an average of 12 RKS mem-
bers per institution, the state is estimated to have about
20200 RKS members.
Sampling
We adopted a multi-stage stratified random sampling
technique. On the basis of pre-existing government of
Odisha zoning of the state, we geographically clustered
30 districts in to three zones – Central, Northern and
Southern. Each zone covered ten districts. Second, the
infant mortality rate (IMR) was taken as a proxy indica-
tor of health system performance; use of process indica-
tors was avoided in view of poor validity. As per the
IMR figures of annual health survey (AHS) report of
2011, from each zone, the best ranked and the worst
ranked district was selected as the primary sampling unit
(PSU). Three districts from three zones having highest
IMR constituted the PD and three having lowest IMR
were categorized as NPD. Service delivery institutions in
the sample districts constituted the secondary sampling
units (SSU). To avoid the urban-rural bias, from each
sample district, the DHH was invariably included in the
study sample. Two CHCs, one each from urban and
rural areas; and two PHCs, one each, under the
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administrative jurisdiction of the sample CHCs were
selected randomly. Thus, 30 institutions/health units
(1 DHH, 2 CHCs and 2 PHCs per district) spread
across six sample districts constituted the sites for data
collection. Open Epi software (http://www.openepi.com/
SampleSize/SSPropor.htm) was used for sample size cal-
culation for respondents of two groups of districts. The
sampling universe constituted all RKS members. We
used the following formula for sample size calculation:
n = [DEFF*Np (1-p)]/ [(d2/Z21-α/2*(N-1) + p*(1-p)]. With
hypothesized 70 % +/− 10 % frequency of outcome fac-
tor (current involvement in management of the health
unit) in the population (p), Confidence limits of 10 % of
100 (absolute +/− %) (d), and design effect of 1, we esti-
mated that 57 samples from each category of districts
would be sufficient. In total 112 respondents were
interviewed.
Data collection
A semi-structured interview schedule was developed in
English, field-tested and translated into local language. It
contained 65 close-ended questions and 8 open-ended
questions. The schedule contained questions on five
broad domains: nature of decision making with regard
to local governance, human resources management,
funds management, infrastructure development, and
quality control; we also elicited responses on regularity
of holding RKS meetings, involvement of RKS members
in planning, monitoring and supervision of programs,
their current training status and training needs. Permis-
sion was obtained from the health & family welfare de-
partment, government of Odisha for conducting this
study. Subsequently the study was approved by an
independent Ethics Committee of IIPHB. Two field in-
vestigators were hired, trained and engaged in data col-
lection. The researcher visited about 20 % sites for
conducting interviews and monitoring quality of data
collection. We obtained written consent from each re-
spondent prior to the interview. Data collection was
done during Sep 2013-June 2014.
Data analysis
The data were entered into MS Access 2007 (Microsoft
Inc., Redmond, WA, USA), after cleaning and validation.
We used SPSS 20.0 (SPSS Inc) for data analysis. Descrip-
tive and inferential statistics were used during data ana-
lysis. P value of ≤ 0.05 was considered significant and
of ≤ 0.001 as highly significant. Mean, median and stand-
ard deviation (SD) were used to analyze respondent pro-
file, frequencies and cross tabulations. All continuous
variables were described in-terms of Mean (+/− SD),
Median and their Range. Categorical variables were pre-
sented in frequency tables. Associations between the two
categories of districts (priority and non-priority) were
analyzed for each dependable variable. Chi square test of
significance was used for nominal and ordinal data. We
felt it appropriate to conduct an independent t-test for
interval data as well as all ranked responses as those
were converted into scores for quantitative comparison.
A composite of individual factors with a score range of
0–16 was developed for 16 designated activities in four
work-related domains: a) current level of involvement in
management of the local health unit; b) interest for
future involvement; c) training status against each ac-
tivity; and d) interest for future training. We assessed
the perception of respondents in a Likert’s scale of 1–
5 (1 = least and 5 = most) about the importance of
organizational factors, such as, power, money, leader-
ship, community demands, non-monetary incentives
and other work-related factors in improving perform-
ance of the health units. In the last section of ana-
lysis, we used a linear regression model to identify
predictors of involvement of RKS members in local
governance. In the model, we included current in-
volvement in management of the local health unit as
dependent variable (DV); and the following as inde-
pendent variables (IV): individual factors (work ex-
perience, qualification, interest for future involvement,
current training status and interest for future training);
and organizational factors (district category, relationship
with other RKS members, frequency of conducting RKS
review, power/authority, community demands, monetary
incentives, good leadership, non-monetary incentives, and
other work-related factors).
Results
Fifty five respondents from PD and 57 from NPD partic-
ipated in the study. The socio-demographic profile of re-
spondents in both groups of districts was found to be
comparable. The mean age of respondents in PD and
NPD districts was (41.1 ± 11.0) and (40.7 ± 11.5) years,
respectively (p = 0.841). Male respondents in PD consti-
tuted 72.7 % as against 71.9 % in NPD (p = 0.925).
Majority of the respondents were having experience of
2–5 years (68.7 %); about one-fifth respondents (14.3 %)
had less than 1 year of experience, whereas those
having > 6 years of experience constituted 17 % (p = 0.08).
About three-fourth of respondents had at least graduation
level education, while 2.7 % were educated up to 10th
standard. Health service providers constituted the max-
imum proportion of respondents (44.6 %), followed by of-
ficials in administrative/managerial role (37.5 %); elected
representatives and officials from other departments
(including independent members) constituted about
one-tenth, each (8.9 %); no significant differences
were observed in the composition of respondents be-
tween both groups of districts. When asked to rank
their relationship with other RKS members in a three
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point scale, majority (61.5 %) of respondents ranked
it as ‘excellent’ (PD = 73.6 % vs. NPD = 50 %; p = 0.041)
and ‘very good’ (35.8 %).
Governance
As compared to PD, higher proportion of respondents
from NPD was involved in district plan preparation
(NPD = 78.9 % vs. PD = 58.5 %) and trained in preparing
the plan (NPD = 47.4 % vs. PD = 27.5 %). On the other
hand, the findings were converse for variables, such as,
participation of representatives from other departments
(PD = 96.9 % vs. NPD = 45.5 %), inclusion of activities of
other sectors (PD = 70.8 % vs. NPD = 41.8 %) and regular
review of the progress (PD = 85.7 % vs. NPD = 90.2 %).
All the above mentioned differences were statistically
significant. Nine out of 49 respondents in PD and 6 out
of 56 respondents in NPD responded positively when
asked as to whether or not they could establish local pri-
orities different from the centrally sponsored schemes
while preparing the annual plan (Table 1). On further
probing about what they had included as ‘different’ than
‘local priorities’, only 4 from PD and 2 from NPD
responded. Fluorosis control, malaria and dengue con-
trol, provision to address water shortage and manage-
ment of malnutrition were cited as the special programs.
Human resource management
We studied the knowledge, perception and experience of
RKS members on human resources management (HRM)
practices. We included questions related to postings,
transfers and suspensions; frequency and approval of
such decisions; role of state officials in such decisions;
Table 1 Opinion, perception and practices related to governance
Attributes District classification P
Priority Non-priority Total
No. % No. % No. %
Are you involved in development of district / sub-district plan of the current year?
Yes 31 58.5 45 78.9 76 69.1 p = 0.020*
No 22 41.5 12 21.1 34 30.9
Total 53 100 57 100 110 100
Are you trained in preparation of district/block operational plans (PIP) development?
Yes 14 27.5 27 47.4 41 38 p = 0.033*
No 37 72.5 30 52.6 67 62
Total 51 100 57 100 108 100
Could you establish local priorities different from the centrally sponsored schemes?
Yes 9 18.4 6 10.7 15 14.3 p = 0.264
No 40 81.6 50 89.3 90 85.7
Total 49 100 56 100 105 100
Do officials from other departments participate in formulating district/block health plan?
Yes 40 76.9 25 45.5 65 60.7 p < 0.001**
No 12 23.1 30 54.5 42 39.3
Total 52 100 55 100 107 100
Do you include activities of other sectors in district/block health plan?
Yes 34 70.8 23 41.8 57 55.3 p = 0.003*
No 14 29.2 32 58.2 46 44.7
Total 48 100 55 100 103 100
How frequently are review/monitoring meetings for health activities conducted?
Weekly 3 6 4 7.1 7 6.6 p = 0.069
Monthly 14 28 26 46.4 40 37.7
Quarterly 32 64 22 39.3 54 50.9
End of year 0 0 0 0 0 0
Irregularly 1 2 4 7.1 5 4.7
Total 50 100 56 99.9 106 99.9
* Significant. ** Highly significant
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the amount of autonomy at local level; and hiring prac-
tices. Perception about the working environment and
training needs were assessed separately. About 42 % de-
cision makers in PD as against 33 % in NPD had pro-
posed transfer or suspension of service providers in the
last 2 years (Table 2). There were significant inter-
category differences with regard to ‘trainings requested’
and ‘trainings conducted’ parameters - higher proportion
of respondents from NPD had requested for and
received training, while the need for capacity building
was higher in PD.
Financial management
Variables such as, funds allocation, resource generation
through user fees, use of additional funds, and vacancy
in accounts section were assessed (Table 3). About
half of the respondents (50.9 %) indicated that the
amount of funds allocated under NHM was ‘manageable’,
Table 2 Opinion, perception and practices related to human resource management
Item District classification p
Priority Non-priority Total
No. % No. % No. %
Did the RKS request for creation of new posts in the last year?
Yes 12 23.5 13 25.5 25 24.5 p = 0.818
No 39 76.5 38 74.5 77 75.5
Total 51 100 51 100 102 100
If yes, were all the requests approved?
Yes, all were approved 3 30 1 7.7 4 17.4 p = 0.179
Some were approved 2 20 7 53.8 9 39.1
None was approved 5 50 5 38.5 10 43.5
Total 10 100 13 100 23 100
Nature of support received from seniors in the district/block?
Very cooperative 29 74.4 48 90.6 77 83.7 p = 0.024*
Supportive of health program 4 10.3 2 3.8 6 6.5
Not concerned at all 1 2.6 3 5.7 4 4.3
Others 5 12.8 0 0 5 5.4
Total 39 100 53 100 92 100
Nature of relationship with subordinates?
Very good 26 54.2 28 50 54 51.9 p = 0.689
good 18 37.5 25 44.6 43 41.3
Bad 4 8.3 3 5.4 7 6.7
Very bad 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 48 100 56 100 104 100
Do the staff in your opinion require any kind of training?
Yes 43 82.7 50 89.3 93 86.1 p = 0.322
No 9 17.3 6 10.7 15 13.9
Total 52 100 56 100 108 100
Was any special training program requested in the last financial year plan?
Yes 8 17.8 36 66.7 44 44.4 p < 0.001**
No 37 82.2 18 33.3 55 55.6
Total 45 100 54 100 99 100
Was any special training conducted in the last financial year?
Yes 6 16.7 30 76.9 36 48 p < 0.001**
No 30 83.3 9 23.1 39 52
Total 36 100 39 100 75 100
* Significant. ** Highly significant
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one-fourth (25.9 %) felt it was ‘grossly insufficient’;
whereas 18.5 % respondents felt it was ‘sufficient’ or ‘more
than adequate’. About 92 % respondents said user fees
was charged for various services in their respective health
units. When further probed as to how such collected fees
were used, responses included the following: minor repair
of infrastructure, fuel for generator, X-ray maintenance,
purchase of Ultrasonography/Ecocardiogram rolls, re-
agents for pathology test and emergency drugs. Further,
40.7 % respondents said that the district proposals got ap-
provals in their original forms, whereas about 21 % re-
spondents replied that they never received any feedback
Table 3 Opinion, perception and practices related to financial management
Items District classification p
Priority Non-priority Total
No. % No. % No. %
The amount of funds allocated under NHM to the RKS?
More than enough 0 0 2 3.6 2 1.9 p = 0.100
Sufficient 12 23.1 7 12.5 19 17.6
Manageable 25 48.1 30 53.6 55 50.9
Insufficient 15 28.8 13 23.2 28 25.9
Grossly insufficient 0 0 4 7.1 4 3.7
Total 52 100 56 100 108 100
Is user-fees being imposed in the institution (health unit)?
Yes 45 88.2 53 94.6 98 91.6 p = 0.233
No 6 11.8 3 5.4 9 8.4
Total 51 100 56 100 107 100
What happens to your request for additional requirements/needs, at state level?
No feedback received 11 27.5 8 15.7 19 20.9 p < 0.001**
Got approved as it was 6 15 31 60.8 37 40.7
Got approved with reduction of budget 7 17.5 4 7.8 11 12.1
Never gets approved 5 12.5 2 3.9 7 7.7
Others 11 27.5 6 11.8 17 18.7
Total 40 100 51 100 91 100
What is the frequency of financial audit?
Quarterly 46 92 34 63 80 76.9 p < 0.001**
Half yearly 1 2 5 9.3 6 5.8
Yearly 2 4 0 0 2 1.9
Don’t know 0 0 1 1.9 1 1
Others 1 2 14 25.9 15 14.4
Total 50 100 54 100 104 100
Any additional funds requested last year?
Yes 26 54.2 25 46.3 51 50 p = 0.427
No 22 45.8 29 53.7 51 50
Total 48 100 54 100 102 100
If ‘yes’, for what purpose?
Drugs 8 34.8 11 44 19 39.6 p = 0.036*
Equipment 5 21.7 2 8 7 14.6
Personnel 6 26.1 1 4 7 14.6
Other purposes 4 17.4 11 44 15 31.3
Total 23 100 25 100 49 100
* Significant. ** Highly significant
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from higher up. Significantly higher proportion of respon-
dents from NPD said they received the approved proposal
in its original form, as compared to PD. About frequency
of audits conducted in the institution, 92 % respondents
in PD and 63 % in NPD said audits were conducted
quarterly – this difference was also statistically significant.
Fifty percent of respondents said they requested for add-
itional funds, last year, and on further probing, 38.8 % re-
spondents informed that they requested additional funds
for purchase of drugs.
Functioning of health units
Less than a tenth of respondents (9.7 %) replied affirma-
tively about initiation of new programs for innovative
health services. Health system strengthening, free medi-
cines, health camps and awareness programs were cited
as new initiatives (Table 4). Further, with regard to the
question of new strategies for service delivery after
formation of RKS, 82.8 % respondents replied. To an
open-ended question as to list the new programs/
services that had been introduced by the RKS in last
1 year, we got various subjective and irrelevant responses.
With respect to the role of state officials in solving local
problems, more than half of respondents (58.3 %) felt that
state directives were useful for solving local problems –
this proportion was significantly higher in NPD as com-
pared to PD (NPD= 78.4 %; PD = 35.6 %; p < 0.001). With
regard to their roles, satisfaction level and perception
about importance of work-related factors, about 87 % re-
spondents were satisfied with their role in the local
governance of the health units. However, this was signifi-
cantly higher (94.3 %) in PD as compared to NPD
(80.7 %). Further, when asked as to how satisfied they were
about their contribution to the improvement of function-
ing of local institutions, almost all respondents (98.2 %)
were ‘satisfied’. Almost all respondents (98 %) in PD and
more than three-fourth (80.7 %) in NPD opined that local
decision making helped in improving the performance of
Table 4 Opinion, perception and practices related to health unit functioning
Items District classification p
Priority Non-priority Total
No. % No. % No. %
Did RKS initiate any new programs in the institution in last three years?
Yes 5 10.6 5 8.9 10 9.7 p = 0.770
No 42 89.4 51 91.1 93 90.3
Total 47 100 56 100 103 100
Did RKS develop innovative methods for providing health services in last three years?
Yes 35 83.3 42 82.4 77 82.8 p = 0.901
No 7 16.7 9 17.6 16 17.2
Total 42 100 51 100 93 100
Are the state directives helping to solve the local problems?
Yes 16 35.6 40 78.4 56 58.3 p < 0.001**
No 29 64.4 11 21.6 40 41.7
Total 45 100 51 100 96 100
Are you happy with the role in management of the local institution?
Yes 50 94.3 46 80.7 96 87.3 p = 0.032*
No 3 5.7 11 19.3 14 12.7
Total 53 100 57 100 110 100
Are you satisfied with contribution to the improvement of the local institutions?
Yes 52 98.1 56 98.2 108 98.2 p = 0.959
No 1 1.9 1 1.8 2 1.8
Total 53 100 57 100 110 100
Does local decision making help in improving performance of the institutions?
Yes 50 98 46 80.7 96 88.9 p = 0.004*
No 1 2 11 19.3 12 11.1
Total 51 100 57 100 108 100
* Significant. ** Highly significant
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local institutions – this difference between PD and NPD
was significant.
Involvement and training
With respect to the frequency of their meeting with or
contacting the zilla parishad (ZP) or block parishad (BP)
president, it was found that about one-sixth of the re-
spondents (15.9 %) never contacted or met the latter.
Higher proportion of members from NPD (26.3 %) had
‘never met’ the president as compared to PD (4 %) and
this difference was significant (p = 0.018). Less than one
third of the respondents (31.2 %) said that they dis-
cussed health, water and sanitation issues in RKS meet-
ings, whereas majority of respondents (68.8 %) replied
that they discussed issues other than health. Further,
27.6 % respondents said they ‘never’ attended the ZP/BP
meetings, as against 30.6 % who said they ‘always’
attended, while 41.8 % participants said they attended
such meetings ‘sometimes’. On the issue of new health
activities initiated by the ZP and/or BP in last two years,
only 5.9 % respondents replied positively and 16.8 %
were under ‘can’t say’ category. When asked as to
‘whether or not the local elected representatives pro-
vided funding support to the RKS, 20 % said ‘yes’ and
about one-sixth were ‘not aware’ of such support – the
proportion was significantly higher in NPD. In the last
section, we assessed their current level of involvement
and training status as to undertake the 12 designated re-
sponsibilities; it was found no significant difference with
respect to the former (involvement) between PD and
NPD and staggering differences with respect to the latter
(training status) – those from NPD had received max-
imum numbers of training courses, whereas the need for
training was the highest in PD.
Factors and predictors of local governance
The mean composite scores for individual factors about
involvement and training of RKS members were ob-
tained. We found the mean score ranged from 15.12
(current involvement) to 15.88 (interest for future in-
volvement and training); for training status, the scores
was abysmally low in PD (0.76) and low for NPD (3.64)
in a scale of 0–16. Further, with regard to the perception
about importance of organizational factors, the mean
scores for most of the factors were higher than 4 in a
scale of 0–5. We conducted an independent t-test to
examine the PD-NPD differences of perceptual means
with respect to individual and organizational factors as
reflected in Table 5. We found significant to highly sig-
nificant difference in perception of respondents between
PD and NPD on relationship with other RKS members
(0.015), training status (0.003), monetary incentives
(0.007), good leadership (0.003), community demands
(0.010) and non-monetary incentives (0.001), and other
work related factors (<0.001). Through regression ana-
lysis, we inferred factors, such as, work experience,
qualification and non-monetary incentives are strongly
associated with current level of involvement of RKS
members in management of the health units (Table 6).
Discussion and conclusion
Leadership and governance is one of the six pillars of
WHO-proposed building block framework on health
system strengthening [21, 45]. The goal is to support a
health system that aims to protect lives; prevent, treat
and control diseases; and maintain population health
[45]. Even though Maun et al. have questioned the suc-
cess of shifting power from officials to citizens in im-
proving the quality and efficiency of care, the outcomes
of such reforms might vary in different contexts [46]. In
governance of health units, the roles and responsibilities
of RKS members in annual health plan preparation is a
critical step towards improving effectiveness of their
functioning. Whereas, concerns related to involvement
of other department officials and establishing local prior-
ities could pose serious challenges to the very existence
RKS in attainment of common objectives. The authority
for transfers, promotions and postings of health work-
force are vested with the state government, except for
periodic arrangements at district level to deal with dis-
trict cadres, such as, the nursing professionals and para-
medics. One possible mechanism to delegate more
powers to the RKS could be through legislative route.
The Society Registration Act of 1860 and provisions
therein have flexibilities to perform, but power/authority
and transparency in decision-making are not priorities
of the Act. Responsibilities must commensurate with au-
thority and expertise. Needless to say, one needs to
adopt a cautious approach to ascertain the inherent
expertise of RKS in taking rational decisions with respect
to local hiring and human resource management
practices - this needs further scrutiny [9].
The quality of MNH care is dependent on availability
of personnel, funds and logistics support. The study
findings could be used to strengthen the national-level
policy for improving the quality of MNH care at the fa-
cilities [47]. For better availability and management of
funds, the guidelines have been circulated to all States/
Union Territories (UT) by government of India. Funds
to the tune of INR 100,000 per PHC, 200,000 per CHC/
SDH and INR 500,000 per DHH are released to the con-
cerned RKS, every year. On the one hand the RKS mem-
bers are seeking more funding support from the state,
but the difficulties in utilization of such funds are often
discussed in various platforms, including review meet-
ings. Moreover, irregular audits and irrational request
for additional funds raise serious questions about the
ability of RKS in planning, implementing and monitoring
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development activities in compliance with the overall fi-
nancial guidelines. RKS is considered as a local self-
governing institution to improve the local management
responses and in turn, strengthening health system pre-
paredness for improved service delivery. However, we find
that decentralized decision-making by RKS does not have
a commensurate collective knowledge, experience and ex-
pertise for governing health units. Individual factors, such
as, experience, qualification and non-monetary incentives
could play critical role in ensuring involvement of RKS
members in local self-governance.
The District Level Household Survey-3 (DLHS-3) re-
port has pointed out that the constitution and utilization
of ‘untied RKS funds’ in the CHC and DHH had been
relatively successful; however, the implementation of
programs by RKS proved problematic at the PHC level.
We find higher sense of satisfaction about the involve-
ment of members in decision making, but porr training
status and higher need for training. Thus, poor know-
ledge and understanding of possible newer service
delivery strategies, poor information about their respon-
sibilities, and non-responsiveness to the patients’ rights
could possibly act as underlying factors for poor func-
tioning of RKS at PHC level. In fact, some of the health
units didn’t have the citizen’s charters displayed, as
observed by the researcher during data collection. On
the other hand, the members had high level of self-
satisfaction about their contribution to the health sys-
tem. These findings are reflective of low level of expect-
ation, poor role clarity, and may be, of a sense of
complacency. A recent study has indicated that inad-
equate support systems for capacity building and train-
ing of local decision makers are constraints which
weakened the impact of RKS [48]. Our study confirms
the earlier similar inferences. Periodic trainings need to
be considered as a potential solution, and provision of
Table 5 Independent t-test for equality of means of individual and organizational factors
Independent t-test for equality of means 95 % CI of the difference
Factors District type N Mean Std. deviation Std. error mean Sig. (2-tailed) Lower Upper
Age Priority 55 41.13 11.039 1.488 .829 −3.761 4.682
Non-priority 57 40.67 11.505 1.524
Work experience (years) Priority 55 3.76 1.962 .265 .434 -.442 1.022
Non-priority 57 3.47 1.947 .258
Relationship with other RKS members Priority 53 4.7170 .4952 .0680 .015a .0492 .4561
Non-priority 56 4.4643 .5709 .0763
Current Involvement Priority 49 15.489 2.0219 .28886 .417 -.5304 1.2700
Non-priority 50 15.1200 2.4713 .3495
Interest for future involvement Priority 49 15.306 3.1963 .4566 .206 −1.4801 .32316
Non-priority 52 15.884 .70444 .0976
Training status Priority 46 .7609 3.3010 .4867 .003a −4.7485 −4.74857
Non-priority 51 3.6471 5.534 .7750
Interest for future training Priority 45 15.888 .43809 .06531 .655 -.2135 .33743
Non-priority 52 15.826 .8794 .12195
Power/authority Priority 49 4.49 .845 .121 .009 .132 .919
Non-priority 56 3.96 1.144 .153
Monetary incentives Priority 49 4.47 .868 .124 .007a .156 .961
Non-priority 56 3.91 1.164 .156
Good leadership Priority 47 4.60 .771 .112 .003a .211 .981
Non-priority 56 4.00 1.128 .151
Community demands Priority 47 4.51 .882 .129 .010a .129 .928
Non-priority 56 3.98 1.120 .150
Non-monetary incentives Priority 45 4.56 .755 .113 .001a .287 1.074
Non-priority 56 3.88 1.145 .153
Other work related factors Priority 39 4.77 .485 .078 <.001b .479 1.242
Non-priority 55 3.91 1.127 .152
a Significant. b Highly significant
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hand-holding support to the RKS may be envisaged as a
long-term option to achieve the overall objectives of
strengthening governance of health units.
Majority of the respondents acknowledged the import-
ance of ability to plan and spend the budget with higher
flexibility; ability to initiate innovative health service pro-
grams, to hire contractual staff, and to be able to set dis-
trict priorities for ensuring effective local choice.
Irregular meeting schedules and erratic decision-making
processes, on the other hand, could act as serious sys-
temic barriers to effective shared governance in the
DMHUs [49, 50]. About the perception on importance
of organizational factors, the mean scores for most of
the factors were higher than 4 in a scale of 0–5 – this is
in conformity with existing evidences about Herzberg’s
motivators and hygiene factors [51]. The gap between
training needs and trainings offered to the RKS members
is very wide which could be cemented through a locally-
monitored capacity building plan – this could not only
help in improving the knowledge and understanding of
the RKS members, but also create an enabling environ-
ment for improving utilization of services. Proper
grievance redressal system (e.g., mandatory display of
citizens’ charter, complaint box) may be ensured in order
to improve involvement of patients and the community.
The functioning of RKS at the PHC and CHC level
needs special emphasis because often these health units
act as the first point of contact between service seekers
and service providers.
Setting the agenda of meetings in advance, following
consultative process during meetings, and provision of
hand-holding support by the higher level institutions
may be considered as potential strategies to overcome
these problems. Conducting regular and productive re-
view meetings by the RKS was considered a major chal-
lenge because of poor role clarity, non-availability of
members and their conflicting priorities. The state gov-
ernment may develop a mechanism to frame stronger
eligibility criteria, including work experience and qualifi-
cation to enter RKS governing body, and provide non-
monetary incentives to the members in order to
strengthen their involvement in governance of health
units.
Using a large cross-sectional institution-level dataset,
this study contributes to better realization of some of
the supply-side factors – it assessed the situation in
terms of knowledge, perception, practices and function-
ing of RKS as an institution of local decision making in
public health sector. It also identified individual and
organizational factors contributing to RKS functioning,
and examined the factors. The study also raises concerns
on prioritization of resource allocation to meet the train-
ing needs of stakeholders. However, whether or not
more empowerment of local RKS bodies would result
in improved utilization of health services, and how
well to address some of the inter-personal barriers to
effective functioning of these institutions, would need
further research. As other studies have pointed out,
an important aspect of further investigation is the
issue of formal and informal coordination mecha-
nisms being followed at various levels that control the
rules of the game [21]. A pilot implementation re-
search may provide answers. Further, the effects of
decentralized governance may be studied from the
Table 6 Linear logistic regression for predictors of local governance
Variables Beta coefficient P value 95.0 % CI
Lower bound Upper bound
Work experience (years) -.096 0.472 −0.363 0.17
Qualification 1.595 .001** 0.69 2.5
Interest for future Involvement −1.137 .020* −2.09 −0.184
Current training status -.101 0.161 −0.243 0.041
Interest for future training .213 0.602 −0.601 1.027
District category .664 0.31 −0.633 1.96
Relationship with other RKS members .648 0.183 −0.314 1.61
Frequency of conducting RKS review meetings -.605 0.139 −1.411 0.201
Power/authority .364 0.716 −1.626 2.353
Monetary incentives -.972 0.315 −2.89 0.947
Good leadership −1.057 0.356 −3.327 1.214
Community demands -.380 0.641 −2.003 1.243
Non-monetary incentives 3.750 .018* 0.677 6.823
Other work-related factors −1.414 0.283 −4.024 1.197
* Significant. ** Highly significant
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perspective of patients, service providers and the commu-
nity at large.
Limitations
This study has several strengths. To our knowledge, this
is the first study on assessing the knowledge, experience
and opinion of local decision makers in health sector in
India. The findings could contribute to the scant litera-
ture on the subject. An empowered RKS could only at-
tain the objectives of high quality service delivery in an
accountable and transparent manner. Data collection
from six 6 districts makes the study geographically
representative of the state. However, with the cross-
sectional nature of study design, pinning down the direc-
tion of association was difficult. A mixed methods study
using reliable and valid health service routine data from
these facilities could be helpful in supporting or refuting
perceptions of respondents. More detailed in-depth in-
terviews could have explored the reasons for the differ-
ences between PD and NPD health facilities.
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